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IN THE I n AH SUPREME COURT 
NEWTON ESTES, : 
Plaintiff Appellant, : Case No. 970193 
v. : 
Judge Don V. Tibbs, Judge K enneth Rigtrup, : I >riorit] ' No 15 
and Judge James Sawaya, 
Defendants/Appellees 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF .JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 Were the plaii itiffs statutory actions, seeking forfeit! ires against the three 
defendant judges, correctly dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to timely file the 
notices of claim required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: I his matter was decided below upon the 
properly considered as motions for summary judgment). Because this issue raises only 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial courts' rulings no deference and review 
1 
them under a correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 
324, 326 (Utah 1997). "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court 
reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its legal 
conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
2. Can plaintiff rely upon the exceptional circumstance version of the discovery 
rule to toll the applicable statute of limitations when the plaintiff was at all times aware of 
the operative facts that he alleges give rise to his claims against the defendants? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendants' motions to dismiss (which included materials outside the pleadings and were 
properly considered as motions for summary judgment). Because this issue raises only 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial courts' rulings no deference and review 
them under a correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 
324, 326 (Utah 1997). Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 
1997). 
3. Is the plaintiff barred from bringing these actions against the defendant judges 
under the issue preclusion branch of res judicata, or collateral estoppel? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendants' motions to dismiss (which included materials outside the pleadings and were 
properly considered as motions for summary judgment). Because this issue raises only 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial courts' rulings no deference and review 
2 
them under a correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 
324, 326 ( [ Jtah 1997), Stephens v. Bonneville "I ravel Inc.. 93., 5 P 2d 518, 519 (I Jtah 
1997). While the action against Judge Tibbs was not dismissed on this grounds, it was 
raised in the trial court and can be considered by this Court on appeal. State v. South. 924 
P.2d3M, 355-5 /(Utah 1996), 
I Is the plaintiff barred from bringing these actions against the defendant judges 
under the claim preclusion branch of res judicata? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court, 
this Court can affirm the decisions of the trial courts on this related, alternative, ground. 
Buehner Block Company v. L)WC Associates. 752 PJd 892, 894-95 (Utah 19X8): Stale 
v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
5. Can the plaintiff state a cause of action for an alleged wrongful and willful 
refusal to allow a writ of habeas corpus where: 1) all three defendant judges required the 
State of i Nati to respond to the plaintiffs petitions, 2) i 10 facts v\ ere alleged to show the 
defendants acted with the conscious intent to act in a manner contrary to justice, and 3) all 
three challenged decisions of the defendant judges have been affirmed on appeal and have 
not been reversed or in any manner brought into question. 
• \NDARD O F R E V I E W ' 1 1: lis mal ter was decided below i i| • i i the 
defendants' motions to dismiss (which included materials outside the pleadings and were 
properly considered as motions for summary judgment) . Because this issue raises only 
3 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial courts' rulings no deference and review 
them under a correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 
324, 326 (Utah 1997). Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 
1997). While the action against Judge Tibbs was not dismissed on this grounds, it was 
raised in the trial court and can be considered by this Court on appeal. State v. South. 924 
P.2d 354, 355-57 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 Definitions. (Supp. 1997) 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages against a 
government entity or against an employee. 
(2)(a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, 
trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board, 
members of a commission, members of an advisory body, officers and employees 
in accordance with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certified in accordance 
with Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services 
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does 
not include an independent contractor, 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), 
whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined 
in this chapter. 
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, 
or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a 
core governmental function, unique to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) a "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, 
employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
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(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any 
other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be 
actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public 
transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or taxing district, or 
other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest 
in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the State of Utah, and includes any officer, department, agency, 
authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other 
instrumentality of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1). Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
(1993) 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities 
are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or 
private facilities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions, (Supp. 1997) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: . . . 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or 
similar authorization. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time for 
filing notice, (1993) 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of 
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whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(2) Within one year. (1996) 
An action may be brought within one year: . . . 
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to an 
individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the statute imposing it 
prescribes a different limitation; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow writ of habeas 
corpus. (1996) 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who wrongfully 
and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever proper application 
for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the 
party thereby aggrieved. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Newton C. Estes filed these three actions against three judges who had previously 
denied petitions for extraordinary writs filed by the plaintiff. In each complaint (styled by 
the pro se plaintiff as petitions for recovery of monetary penalties), Estes alleged that the 
dismissal of his prior petitions on the part of the defendant judges had been wrongful and 
willful. Estes v. Tibbs. Case No. 960601239, T.R. at 1-3; Estes v. Sawaya. Case No. 
960905955CV, S.R. at 1-2; Estes v. Rigtrup. Case No. 960905255CV, R.R. at 1-3. 
Judges Rigtrup, Sawaya, and Tibbs all moved to dismiss these actions on the 
grounds that: 1) no notice of claim had been timely filed, 2) the actions were barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations, 3) the actions were barred by collateral estoppel, and 
4) that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action. T.R. at 33-144, R.R. 29-145, S.R. 
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at 21-143. Each of these motions were styled motions to dismiss, but included affidavits 
and copies of other materials. Id 
All three actions were dismissed by the trial courts. The action against Judge 
Tibbs was dismissed on two of the grounds raised and the actions against Judges Rigtrup 
and Sawaya were dismissed on all four grounds raised by the defendants. T.R. at 179-80, 
R.R. at 173-75, S.R. at 185-87. Estes brought the present, consolidated, appeals from the 
dismissal of these three actions. T.R. at 182, R.R. at 179, S.R. at 188. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Estes sought from each of the three defendant judges the statutory forfeiture 
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 (1996). In each case, Estes claimed that the 
judges were liable because they had denied his prior petitions for extraordinary writs. In 
each case the judges had required the State of Utah to respond to the petitions before 
considering them on the merits. In each case, the dismissal of Estes1 petitions has been 
affirmed on appeal. T.R. at 1-3, 54-61, R.R. at 1-3, 43-52, S.R. at 1-2, 34-51. 
Estes also claims that Judge Tibbs is liable because one petition was returned to 
Estes because it was addressed to the Sixth Circuit Court (which no longer existed) and 
another petition was returned for Estes' failure to file an affidavit of impecuniosity. T.R. 
at 2-3. 
Each of the defendant judges submitted undisputed affidavits that showed that no 
notice of claim was ever filed by the plaintiff. T.R. at 45-52, R.R. at 133-38, S.R. at 132-
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37. The defendants also submitted copies of a prior civil action, filed in federal court, 
against them by Estes with evidence that it had been dismissed on the merits. T.R. at 24-
32, 70-139, R.R. at 53-132, S.R. at 52-131. Estes federal action also claimed that the 
defendant judges were liable to him for their denial of his prior petitions for extraordinary 
writs. Estes, in his federal action, expressly alleged that Judges Sawaya and Tibbs had 
violated section 78-35-1. S.R. at 61, T.R. at 86-87. The federal lawsuit also raised Estes' 
claims against Judge Tibbs for the alleged failure to file the two petitions, one because it 
was addressed to a court that no longer existed and the second for Estes' failure to file an 
affidavit of impecuniosity. T.R. at 87. 
Estes has stipulated that his claims are subject to the one-year statute of limitations 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(2) (1996), and that these three actions were not 
brought within the statute. Appellant's Brief at 13-14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Estes brought these three actions against government employees, alleging that the 
defendants were liable to the plaintiff for their judicial acts performed in the course and 
scope of their duties. At no time did Estes file the prerequisite notices of claim required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993). Estes' argument that a forfeiture is not an "injury" 
does not save his actions. Such an action for forfeiture falls within the definition of 
"claim" as that term is used in section 12 and a notice of claim was required whether or 
not this Court should determine that such a forfeiture was not an "injury." Further, the 
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word "injury" is sufficiently broad, both as defined in the statute and in its normal 
meaning to include these actions and the trial courts were correct in dismissing these 
matters for failure to file the necessary notices of claim. 
Plaintiffs claim that his failure to file his actions within the applicable statute of 
limitations should be excused is fatally flawed. Estes tries to bring his actions within the 
exceptional circumstances version of the discovery rule. But Estes was at all times aware 
of the facts upon which his claims rest and cannot therefore make the requisite threshold 
showing that he did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the facts in time 
to commence his actions within the period. 
Estes has previously sued these defendants concerning this very factual situation. 
Indeed, Estes expressly claimed in his prior civil action that Judges Tibbs and Sawaya 
violated this very forfeiture statute. Plaintiffs claims against the defendants are barred by 
both the claim and issue preclusion branches of res judicata. Even though the defendants 
did not raise the claim preclusion branch of res judicata below, this Court should consider 
this alternative ground for affirmance. The record adequately supports this claim and 
judicial economy would be served if this Court were to consider this issue rather than 
remand for the trial court to again dismiss this action and await a second appeal to decide 
this issue. 
The forfeiture statute in question (section 78-35-1) only applies to circumstances 
where the petition is summarily denied, without response, by the trial court and not to 
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instances, such as these actions, where the state has responded to the petition and the 
merits of the matter have been decided after a trial, evidentiary hearing, or upon motion. 
Further, the defendant judges cannot be said to have willfully and wrongfully denied the 
petitions when their dismissals of the petitions have been affirmed on appeal and have not 
been reversed or in any manner brought into question. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THESE ACTIONS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE THE 
REQUISITE NOTICES OF CLAIM 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State 
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. This Court has held that the filing of the notice 
of claim require by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) is a precondition to filing any suit 
against the state or its employees. Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 (Utah 
1988). This Court has ruled on numerous occasions that Ml compliance with the 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of 
action thereunder. Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiff does not allege that the three defendants, as state court judges, are not 
employees of the State of Utah. He does not allege that the defendants' actions and 
omissions that he complains of did not occur during the performance by the defendants of 
their duties as government employees. Nor does the plaintiff allege that the challenged 
10 
actions of the defendants do not fall within the scope of the employment of the defendants 
as government employees. 
Plaintiffs sole argument is that his forfeiture actions under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35-1 (1996) does not fall within the definition of "injury" found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-2(5) (1993). Whether or not the current actions come within the definition of "injury" 
in the Governmental Immunity Act is not dispositive. The Act requires that: 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, 
is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned within one year after the 
claim arises, . . . . 
§63-30-12, in part. 
The Immunity Act defines a claim as "any claim or cause of action for money or 
damages against a government entity or against an employee." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
2(1) (Supp. 1997). Plaintiffs forfeiture actions are either claims or causes of action for 
money. As such, plaintiff had the obligation to file a timely notice of claim that he has 
failed to do. Whether or not a forfeiture action falls within the statute's definition of 
"injury" does not change the fact that a notice of claim should have been filed. 
But plaintiff also errs in his argument that his claims for money against the 
defendants do not come within the definition of injury in the Immunity Act. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, 
11 
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or 
his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2, in part. 
The Act contains four different definitions of injury: 1) death, 2) personal injury, 
3) damage or loss to property, and 4) any injury to person or estate that would be 
actionable if inflicted by a private person. Personal injury is broadly defined as injury of 
any kind other than property damage. The word injury means: 
Any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, 
rights, reputation, or property. The invasion of any legally 
protected interest of another. 
Black's Law Dictionary 706 (5th ed. 1979). 
The trial courts correctly determined that the Governmental Immunity Act was 
applicable to the plaintiffs claims. To accept the plaintiffs argument would create the 
anomaly that no notice of claim would be required, even though the Act expressly retains 
the State of Utah's immunity for claims of wrongful denial of plaintiff s petitions and the 
refusal to issue the requested writ. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) (Supp. 1997). For 
these reasons the defendants urge this Court to affirm the dismissal of these actions. 
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II. THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE VERSION 
OF THE DISCOVERY RULE CANNOT BE APPLIED 
WHEN ESTES WAS AT ALL TIMES AWARE OF THE 
OPERATIVE FACTS OF HIS CLAIMS 
Plaintiff has stipulated that the one-year statute of limitations for actions found in 
section 78-12-29(2) for actions for a statutory forfeiture is applicable. Appellant's Brief 
at 13-14. Plaintiff also stipulates that the claims he presents arose from four to six years 
before the present actions were filed. Id The plaintiffs claims against the defendants are 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
In an effort to avoid the application of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff asks 
this Court to apply the exceptional circumstances version of the discovery rule. 
Appellant's Brief at 15. What plaintiff has failed to address is that there exists a threshold 
issue before the discovery rule can be applied. 
The first step in determining whether the discovery rule 
applies is to examine whether the Sevys made the threshold 
showing that they did not know, nor should have known, of 
Security Title's negligence at the time of the closing. See id. 
([A]n initial showing must be made that plaintiff did not know 
of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of 
the cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation 
period."). 
Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995). 
Mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action does not permit the plaintiff 
to use the discovery rule. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). The 
plaintiff must show that he "did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the 
13 
facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action" before the statute of 
limitations ran. Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 902 R2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 
1995). It was not necessary that Estes knew all of the facts underlying his cause of 
action, simply that he knew sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on notice of the 
duty to inquire. Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992); 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah Ct. App 1996) ("The 
limitations period is postponed only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed 
discovery of legal theories."). 
Estes knew at all times that the defendants had denied his petitions for 
extraordinary writs. Plaintiff was aware of all of the key facts at all times. He had 
"sufficient information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the underlying cause of action] so as to 
put them on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions about the 
defendant's actions." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d45, 51 (Utah 1996). The 
exceptional circumstances version of the discovery rule is inapplicable to this matter 
because there was no belated discovery of key facts. Estes had the duty to exercise 
reasonable diligence in acting upon the facts that he knew, and his statutory claims 
against these defendants should have been filed within one-year of their judicial conduct 
in denying the plaintiffs petitions. The trial courts correctly determined that these claims 
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that decision should be affirmed. 
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Even if the plaintiff could make the necessary threshold showing that he was not 
aware of the key facts concerning his claims, which he can't, the trial courts were still 
correct to refuse to use the discovery rule in these matters. Plaintiff asks the courts to 
judicially recreate the legislature's since repealed disability statute concerning 
imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1975).1 He has not identified any facts that 
would distinguish him from all other inmates in the State of Utah. Defendants urge this 
Court, as a matter of public policy, not to so drastically extend the discovery rule so as to 
apply to all inmates during their incarceration regardless of their knowledge of the 
operative facts of their claims. 
HI. ESTES WAS BARRED BY COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL FROM RELITIGATING AN ISSUE 
ALREADY REJECTED BY THE FEDERAL COURT 
The issue preclusion theory of res judicata, also known as collateral estoppel, is 
applicable to this action. 
The party seeking to invoke this doctrine must satisfy four 
requirements. First, the party must show that the issue 
challenged in the case at hand is identical to the issue decided 
in the previous action. Second, the issue in the previous 
action must have been decided in a final judgment on the 
merits. Third, the issue in the previous action must have been 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated. Fourth, the opposing 
1
 Even under the 1975 statute, the statute of limitations would not have been tolled 
for Estes. He was sentenced to a five-year to life term. S.R. at 49. The disability only 
applied to those incarcerated for "a term less than for life." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
36(3) (1975). 
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party in the action at hand must have been either a party or 
privy to the previous action. 
Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995). 
Plaintiff does not dispute that the second and fourth elements of this test were 
satisfied. Appellant's Brief at 17. Plaintiff also admits that the prior federal action and 
the current actions were based upon the "same factual predicate." Id Este's only claims 
are that the issues are not identical and that the federal matter was not competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. 
Estes' federal action expressly claimed that Judges Tibbs and Sawaya had violated 
section 78-35-1. T.R. at 86-87, S.R. at 61. While his claims against Judge Rigtrup in the 
federal matter did not expressly cite to this statute, the plaintiff did claim that Judge 
Rigtrup refused to grant his petition. R.R. at 61-62. 
This Court has stated that the issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) "prevents the 
relitigation of issues that have once been adjudicated even though the claims for relief in 
the separate actions may be different. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996); 
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). The question of 
whether the defendants1 actions were improper in denying the plaintiffs petitions was 
directly considered, and rejected by the federal court. These issues can not be relitigated 
in these actions. 
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Estes argues that, because he appealed pro se in the federal action, and because 
that matter was dismissed on motions before discovery, that the federal action can not be 
said to have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated. The federal courts apply a 
lenient standard to the pleadings and causes of action of pro se litigants. T.R. at 26, 113-
14, R.R. at 96-97, 126, S.R. at 95-96, 125. Defendants are unaware of any requirement 
that a prior action go to discovery or trial for res judicata to apply to its outcome. 
Plaintiff has not cited to any precedent for such a rule. Defendants urge this Court to 
reject such a rule and to find that the prior federal action did not fail to meet the fourth 
test for issue preclusion simply because the plaintiff appeared pro se and his causes of 
action were found to be without merit. Estes' present actions are barred by the issue 
preclusion version of res judicata and the dismissal of these actions should be affirmed on 
this ground. 
IV. ESTES WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, 
CLAIM PRECLUSION, FROM BRINGING THESE 
FURTHER ACTIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 
Though not directly raised in the trial courts, plaintiffs actions are also barred by 
the claim preclusion version of res judicata. Estes* prior federal court litigation acts as a 
bar to the present lawsuits under both versions of res judicata. 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in 
which that cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit 
satisfy three requirements. First, both cases must involve the 
same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged 
to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must 
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be one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
It is undisputed that Estes, as plaintiff, sued these three defendant judges in the 
prior federal court proceeding. It is also undisputed that the federal action resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits against Estes and in favor of the defendants. Defendants 
submit that the second requirement is also met in these matters. Estes sued Judges 
Sawaya, Tibbs, and Rigtrup in federal court, alleging that they had violated his rights and 
conspired against him by refusing to grant any of his three petitions for extraordinary 
relief that they considered. He expressly claimed that the actions of Judges Sawaya and 
Tibbs violated section 78-35-1. Estes did raise the issues presented in the current actions 
in the prior litigation. Even if he had not, he could and should have raised these claims 
arising from the same facts in the prior litigation. For this reason, defendants urge this 
Court to find that the plaintiff is barred from bringing the present actions by the claim 
preclusion version of res judicata as well as by the issue preclusion version. 
This Court has held that it "may affirm trial court decisions on any proper 
ground(s), despite the trial courts having assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner 
Block Co. v. UWC Assoc. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) (trial court decision affirmed 
on grounds that were not raised in the trial court). In State v. South. 924 P.2d at 355 n.3, 
this Court noted that certain of its other decisions were not consistent with the result 
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reached in Buehner. Defendants urge this Court to affirm the Buehner line of cases as 
being consistent with this Court's decision in South and being good public policy in that it 
permits judicial efficiency. In South, this Court held that the important question as to 
whether an alternative ground for affirmance can be considered is that parties not be 
permitted to employ their adversary's appeal to gain a greater benefit for themselves or 
lessen the rights of their opponents. South, 924 P.2d at 356. This Court rejected the 
notion, as contrary to fairness, common sense, and judicial efficiency, that a prevailing 
party should be forced to file a cross-appeal for the sole purpose of seeking the 
affirmance of the trial court's decision on an alternative ground that was rejected by the 
trial court. 
In the same manner, a prevailing party should be permitted to seek the affirmance 
of the trial court on alternative grounds that had not yet been presented to the trial court. 
In this action, defendants would be free to raise res judicata on remand. Rather than be 
forced to return to the trial court to present this issue, and await a second appeal to present 
this matter to this Court, it would greatly increase judicial efficiency to permit such 
alternative grounds for affirmance to be considered on the first appeal if they could make 
remand unnecessary. Defendants urge this Court to affirm its Buehner decision. 
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applies a test 
similar to Buehner. "We may affirm the grant of summary judgment for reasons other 
than those used by the district court as long as they are adequately supported by the 
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record." Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112F.3d 1398, 1402-3 (10th Cir. 1997V Orner v. 
Shalala. 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) ("we may affirm challenged decisions of the 
district court on alternative grounds, so long as the record is sufficient to permit 
conclusions of law."). 
The trial court records is sufficient to show that the claim preclusion version of res 
judicata would apply to bar Estes1 current litigation against the same judges he has 
previously sued concerning the same circumstances. Defendants urge this Court to affirxn 
the dismissal of these actions on this alternative grounds. 
V. THE FORFEITURE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY 
TO ACTIONS WHERE THE JUDGE GRANTED THE 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, BUT THEN DENIED 
RELIEF ON THE MERITS, AND WHERE SUCH 
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED ON APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 (1996) does not impose the liability on the defendants 
sought by the plaintiff for three reasons. First, the statute only applies to those 
circumstances where a judge summarily denies a petition for habeas corpus and refuses to 
consider the merits of the petition. Second, the plaintiff failed to allege any facts to show 
that the defendants' actions in denying his petitions on the merits were performed with the 
requisite conscious intent to act in a manner contrary to justice. Third, all three of the 
challenged decisions of the defendants were affirmed on appeal. None of these decisions 
has been reversed or in any manner brought into question. 
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A. The defendants did not deny plaintiffs writ of habeas corpus. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 (1996), states: 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, 
who wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas 
corpus whenever proper application for the same has been made 
shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby 
aggrieved. 
This statute has remained unchanged since statehood. The writ of habeas corpus 
mentioned in the statute did not determine the legality of a persons incarceration, it 
simply was the mechanism for bringing the individual who claimed to be unlawfully 
detained before the court for a determination as to whether or not the incarceration was 
valid. Rule 65B(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988). In Farrell v. Turner. 482 P.2d 
117, 119 (Utah 1971), this Court explained the requirement in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure that a judge, refusing to order a petitioner to be brought before the court, was 
to set out in writing his or her reasons for denying the writ. 
This provision of the Rules deals with the case where no writ 
is issued by the court and not to the trial when the petitioner 
has been produced in court pursuant to the writ. Section 78-
35-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides for a forfeiture of not exceeding 
$5,000 in case a judge unlawfully and wilfully refuses to 
allow a writ to be issued, and the rule requiring the reasons 
for refusal to allow the writ to be made in writing is intended 
to be of assistance to both the petitioner and the judge in the 
event the applicant undertakes to recover the forfeiture 
provision of the statute. 
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This statute was never meant to be used against a judge who considered the merits 
of a petition for extraordinary writ and then denied the same. It was intended to sanction 
a judicial officer who wrongfully and willfully refused to consider the merits, improperly 
dismissing the petition as frivolous. Other courts, considering similar forfeiture statutes 
have come to the same conclusion Rhodes v. Glenn. 24 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1943) (lower court judge liable for refusing to grant a writ when he mistakenly believed 
the petition was so defective as to warrant a refiisal to issue a writ); Blodgett v. Ladd. 162 
N.W. 233 (Iowa 1917); Goetz v. Black. 240 N.W. 94 (Mich. 1932). 
None of the defendant judges refused the plaintiff the then current equivalent of 
the writ of habeas corpus. Each granted the writ and ordered the State of Utah to respond 
pursuant to Rule 65B(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988). None of the 
defendants failed to issue the writ pursuant to Rule 65B(f)(3) (1988). For this reason, the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs actions should be affirmed. 
B. Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing defendants acted wrongfully and willfully. 
It is not enough that the plaintiffs petitions were denied. Estes was required to 
allege facts that would show that the defendants wrongfully and willfully denied his 
petitions. This he failed to do. Wrongful is defined as "Injurious, heedless, unjust, 
reckless, unfair. Infringement of some right." Black's Law Dictionary 1446 (5th ed. 
1979). An act is willfully done if "done voluntarily and intentionally and with the 
specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to do something 
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the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to 
disregard the law." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979) 
No facts have been alleged other than that the petitions were denied. The trial 
court decisions to dismiss these actions should be affirmed because no factual basis has 
been alleged to meet the burden of showing that the actions of the defendants were 
wrongful and willful. 
C. That all three challenged decisions were affirmed on appeal. 
The only allegations made against the defendant judges is that they "wrongfully 
and willfully" denied the plaintiffs petitions. But the challenged decisions of Judges 
Sawaya, Rigtrup and Tibbs have all been affirmed on appeal. T.R. at 1-3, 54-61, R.R. at 
1-3, 43-52, S.R. at 1-2, 34-51. Defendants urge this Court to find that before a decision 
of a trial judge can be challenged under this statute, that an initial showing be required 
that the challenged decision has in some manner been brought into question. 
In Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 
adopted such a rule for challenges to criminal proceedings (including writs of habeas 
corpus) brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other 
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct 
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a 
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called 
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into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that 
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so 
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 
Id. at 2372 (emphasis in original). 
Defendants urge this Court to find that a plaintiff can not state a cause of action 
under section 78-35-1 when the decision he challenges has been affirmed on appeal. To 
do otherwise would permit actions, such as the current one, in which a litigious party can 
continually seek to relitigate the same issues. First, Estes sought, and lost relief by means 
of numerous petitions for extraordinary relief. Next, he filed civil rights actions against 
the judges who denied his petitions (and many others). Now, he has filed this statutory 
cause of action once again challenging the propriety of trial court decisions that were 
affirmed on appeal and have never been called into question. 
Plaintiffs claim that Judge Tibbs' refusal to permit the filing of a further petition 
without an affidavit of impecuniosity or payment of a filing fee violated section 78-35-1 
also fails to state a cause of action. The Utah Court of Appeals expressly rejected the 
plaintiffs interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-2 (1991) in Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 
P.2d 927, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Those statutory provisions require a court to accept filings 
accompanied by an affidavit of impecuniosity without 
assessing a filing fee, but also require a court to determine 
whether the litigant is actually impecunious and to require 
civil litigants who are not found to be impecunious to pay a 
filing fee. 
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Hansen involved an inmate's petition for an extraordinary writ. While this Court is 
in no manner bound by the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, the defendant trial 
judges are. Defendant Tibbs submits that he can not be said to have acted willfully and 
wrongfully when his alleged wrongful decision was in accordance with how the statutes 
have been interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Newton Estes failed to file a timely notice of claim. These actions were filed years 
after the applicable statute of limitations had run. Because plaintiff was aware of the facts 
that allegedly support his claims at all times, the discovery rule does not apply. Estes has 
previously litigated against these defendants in federal court on these issues and facts and 
lost on the merits. Both the claim and issue preclusion versions of res judicata bar the 
plaintiffs current claims. Finally, plaintiff can not state a cause of action because the 
defendant judges granted him writs of habeas corpus, they just ruled against him on the 
merits of his actions. The statute Estes relies on does not apply in these circumstances. 
Further, Estes can not claim that the defendant judges decisions were wrongful and 
willful when they have been affirmed on appeal. 
For these reasons, defendant Judges Sawaya, Rigtrup, and Tibbs ask this Court to 
affirm the dismissal of these actions. 
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DEFENDANTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT 
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
The defendants-appellees do not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a 
published opinion are necessary, though the defendants desire to participate in oral 
argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this _^_fda^ of June, 1998. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendants-Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this the of June, 
1998: 
Todd M. Shaughnessy 
SNELL & WILLMER 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Centre 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "A 
JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Judge James Kenneth Rigtrup 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FORv 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff Pro Se, 
vs. 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
Defendant. 
ORDEJ^ 
/ 
Civil No. 960905255 CV 
/ Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 12th day of February, 1997 at 8:00 a.m. 
before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge of the above entitled court on the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally present and 
appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John P. Soltis. 
The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral argument and 
being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order: 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-
11, -12 and plaintiff's civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the Judicial Code, Utah 
Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and 
4. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
DATED t h i s ^ day o f i ^ X u ^ u ^ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
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ADDENDUM "B 
JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 12th day of February, 1997 at 
8:00 a.m. before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge of the above entitled court on the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally 
present and appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John 
P. Soltis. The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral 
argument and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order: 
97 
ivil No. 960905955 CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-30-11, -12 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the Judicial Code, 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and 
4. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
DATED this J ? ^ d a y oi<d£^A^a^ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT \ 
' JtfD6E ROBERT K. HOLDER 
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ADDENDUM "C 
JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 960601239 
Judge Kay L. Mclff 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of February, 1997 at 
11:00 a.m. before the Honorable Kay L. Mclff, Judge of the above entitled court on the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally 
present and appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John 
P. Soltis. The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral 
argument and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order: 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalties ($15,000) for THREE 78-35-1 Violations 
is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
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Code Ann. §§63-30-11, -12 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred, 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalties ($15,000) for THREE 78-35-1 Violations 
is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the 
Judicial Code, Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally 
barred; , 
DATED this,^) day of WjA^Mrh, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
-% 
# 
tfUDGE KA.YC MCIFF 
^ MAJJ^ NG CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, 
St 
this^l day of February, 1997, to the following: 
Newton C. Estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
(801) 544-5253 
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